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1 Introduction
One of the crucial questions in economics is what determines income di¤erences among coun-
tries. Why are there such large and persistent income di¤erences among countries? Growth
di¤erences between countries are accounted for by di¤erences in human capital, physical capital
and technology (e.g. Mankiw et al. 1992). However, why is a poor country unable to replicate
a rich country to achieve higher human, physical capital and technology levels? Over the last
two decades there has been a lot of research devoted to better understanding the long term
determinants of economic development. In that respect, institutions, international trade and
geography are found to be the factors that a¤ect income di¤erences between countries in the
long term.
One camp argues that institutional quality is the most important determinant of income
di¤erences among countries. North (1990) pointed out the importance of institutions as a
main factor of economic development. Hall and Jones (1999) pointed out the importance of
institutions and linked institutions to colonial time and the origin of the colonizer. Acemoglu
et al. (2001) found that many countriesinstitutional quality was shaped at colonization time
and persisted over time and the di¤erence in institutional quality is the main reason behind
cross-country income per capita di¤erences. Engerman and Sokolo¤(1997), Easterly and Levine
(2003), Rodrik et al. (2004), Bosker and Garretsen (2009) are among the many papers that
contributed to the debate of the e¤ect of institutions on economic development in the long
term.
Another camp argues that geographical characteristics of the country are the most direct
determinants of development. Sachs (2003) pointed out the importance of the disease envi-
ronment that acts as a barrier to economic development for the poorest countries. Bloom and
Sachs (1998) and Gallup et al. (1998) found that the disease environment has an e¤ect on
economic growth and suggest that a disease environment is geographically specic after con-
trolling for institutions. Sachs (2003) shows malaria transmission directly a¤ects the level of
per capita income after controlling for the quality of institutions. Since malaria transmission
is strongly a¤ected by ecological conditions, Sachs (2003) concluded that geography a¤ects
economic development directly.
International trade is also considered to be one of the main determinants of economic de-
velopment. Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that trade openness has a causal link to economic
development. They use geographical factors to obtain trade openness by summing the pre-
dicted bilateral trade shares and found that it has a direct e¤ect on economic development.
Diamond (1997), Sachs and Warner (1995), Dollar and Kraay (2003) are some other papers
2
which emphasized the impact of international trade on development.
There has been a lot of research done on what is called deepdeterminants of economic de-
velopment. However, there have been many criticisms on how institutional quality is measured.
As Glaeser et al. (2004) pointed out, how institutional quality is measured is the root ques-
tion. Among the most commonly used institutional quality measures are the World Governance
Indicators (WGI hereafter). Our present study will try to contribute to this debate.
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), KKZ hereafter, rst establish a new database
of governance indicators. They constructed six aggregate indicators corresponding to six basic
governance concepts: voice and accountability (VA hereafter), political stability (PS hereafter),
government e¤ectiveness (GE hereafter), regulatory quality (RQ hereafter), rule of law (RL
hereafter) and control of corruption (CC hereafter). Over the years these aggregate indicators
were updated, see KKZ (2002), Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, KKM hereafter, (2004, 2005,
2006, and 2007a). KKM (2008) lastly updated WGI, six aggregate governance indicators for the
years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002-2007 annually, covering 202 countries. These aggregate indica-
tors are based on hundreds of specic and disaggregated individual variables measuring various
dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 32 di¤erent organizations.
In the empirical literature, WGIs are used as composite (equally-weighted) indices in two
ways: rst use is the WGI composite index for a given year (i.e. averaging six governance
indicators at a given year),1 its second use is the indicator composite index (i.e. taking average
of a specic indicator: VA, GE, PS, RQ, RL or CC over the whole period or a specic indicator
at a given year).2
Using both the WGI and indicator composite indices with xed equal weights in the empir-
ical literature su¤ers from many shortcomings as it ignores the dependence among governance
indicators, it introduces double counting of highly correlated indicators and it is also plagued
by measurement error problems. In this paper we will follow an approach for the construc-
tion of best-case scenario of aggregate indices based on stochastic dominance e¢ ciency (SDE
hereafter) analysis that avoids the problems mentioned above.3
Constructing a best-case scenario governance index based on SDE analysis has advantages,
since it provides an e¢ cient index resulting from the least variable combination of components
1See, for example, Neumayer (2002); Easterly and Levine (2003); Beck and Laeven (2006); Easterly
(2007); Durlauf et al. (2008) for the similar use of the world governance indicators.
2See, for example, Dollar and Kraay (2003); Rodrik et al. (2004); Bulte et al. (2005); Harms and
Lutz (2006); Aidt et al. (2008); Brunnschweiler (2008); Bosker and Garretsen (2009) for the similar
use of the world governance indicators.
3Space restrictions preclude us to present the best-case scenario WGIs for each year but we present
the best-case scenario for each governance indicator. The results for the best-case scenarios for each
year are available upon request from the author.
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that maximize the level of governance over time for each country or group of countries. Sec-
ondly, economic theory is agnostic in terms of o¤ering us strong guidance about functional
form of preferences and distributions of the di¤erent components of governance indicators, and
relatively large data sets are available, so that nonparametric analysis can let the data speak
for themselves. The best-case scenario of the governance index refers to the fact that it gives
the greatest value of governance level over time for a given probability. In other words, we
will construct an index with those weights that will make it stochastically dominate all other
competitor indices.
It is worth mentioning that the best-case scenario weighting scheme that we obtain in
this paper is derived from the nature of the stochastic dominance (SD hereafter) optimization
problem and refers to the measured level of governance and not the true governance.
In our analysis, we take the choice of governance indicators as given and we look at what
constitutes the most optimistic scenario given the choice of these governance indicators. This
criterion gives emphasis on reducing the overall volatility and as such favoring more equal
governance levels. An index that is the least volatile produces the most meaningful comparisons
across countries under consideration and any movements over time will be less subjected to
measurement error (i.e. change in scores to upward or downward shift will be minimized). In
the next section we discuss some of the issues and shortcomings with the use of the equally-
weighted governance indices and discuss how the best-case scenario institutional quality indices
handle those shortcomings.
An important reason why SD has not been applied before (based on its theoretical attrac-
tiveness) in the construction of indices is that until recently, SD could only be tested pair-wise.
This restriction was limiting the scope of SD tests, because indices are constructed from a
set of components and they e¤ectively face innitely many choice alternatives. Barrett and
Donald (2003) developed pair-wise SD comparisons that relied on Kolmogorov-Smirnov type
tests developed within a consistent testing environment. This o¤ers a generalization to An-
derson (1996), Beach and Davidson (1983) and Davidson and Duclos (2000) who have looked
at second order SD using tests that rely on pair-wise comparisons made at a xed number of
arbitrary chosen points. This is not a desirable feature since it introduces the possibility of test
inconsistency. Davidson and Duclos (2000) have discussed the importance of rst, second and
third order stochastic dominance concepts (SD1, SD2, and SD3 respectively) between income
distributions for social welfare and poverty rankings of distributions. As the above mentioned
tests are pair-wise in nature, Bawa et al. (1985) extend on the concept of convex stochastic
dominance which is rst introduced by Fishburn (1974), and provided tests that satisfy neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions if more than two choice alternatives are compared. However, the
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Bawa et al. (1985) approach only considers a nite number of choice alternatives, not a full
diversication.
On the other hand, recently Post (2003) and Kuosmanen (2004) introduced the notion
of SDE, which allow for full diversication. Both the Post (2003) and Kuosmanen (2004)
approaches are based on derivations of ranked observations under an independent identical
distribution (iid) assumption of the asset returns. In other words, both Post (2003) and Kuos-
manen (2004) o¤er a sampling scheme assuming iid observations and therefore do not allow for
possible data dependence such as GARCH e¤ects often encountered in high frequency returns
(see e.g. Linton and Whang 2012). Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010), hereafter ST, not only allow
for full diversication similar to the Post (2003) and Kuosmanen (2004) methodologies but also
extend the Barrett and Donald (2003) and Horvath et al. (2006) approaches by allowing for
time-dependent data. In other words, the ST methodology allows for full diversication for
serially correlated time-dependent data by extending the existing approaches mentioned above.
As the WGIs are serially correlated over time and there are innitely many alternative weight-
ing schemes to choose from, we employ the ST methodology to obtain the best-case scenario
governance indices. We use the ST approach to test whether the equally-weighted governance
indicators are the best-case scenarios or there exist alternative weighing schemes that domi-
nate any other alternative weighting scheme by using the same set of attributes (i.e. VA, PS,
GE, RQ, RL and CC over time) to construct the best-case scenario governance indices.4 We
derive the best-case scenarios of governance indicators that maximize the measured governance
levels in a rst-order stochastic dominance sense. The best-case scenario governance indicators
therefore maximize the measured achieved governance levels and also achieve the minimum
variability among its competitors.5
To sum up, in this paper, rstly we obtain the best-case governance indices for a study spe-
cic sample of countries that have been used as institutional quality proxy in the literature and
therefore, tackling the issue of excess variability in the construction of equally-weighted gov-
4Similar applications employed by Pinar et al. (2013) to construct the best-case scenario of Human
Development Index and Agliardi et al. (2012) to construct a riskiest sovereign risk index for the
emerging countries. The current study di¤ers from the above mentioned ones in two ways. Firstly,
both Pinar et al. (2013) and Agliardi et al. (2012) examine the absolute levels of human development
and sovereign risk respectively. However, in the current paper we examine the relative levels of
governance indicators. In that case we derive the least volatile governance indices and therefore these
indices will be less subject to measurement error. Secondly, the current study examines the e¤ect of
the use of the proposed indices in the relevant literature as institutional quality proxies and provides
further insights on how measurement could be an important issue.
5As each governance indicator is bounded between -2.5 and +2.5, higher measured governance
levels for more countries suggest a distribution that is negatively skewed and therefore having lower
variability across countries and over time.
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ernance indices by using stochastic dominance e¢ ciency. Secondly, we revisit three prominent
studies, namely Easterly and Levine (2003), EL hereafter, Rodrik et al. (2004), and Bosker and
Garretsen (2009), BG hereafter, with the proposed best-case governance indices as institution
proxies. Rather than using an average of six governance indicators as an institutional quality
(e.g. Easterly and Levine 2003) or certain indicator(s) for a given year (e.g. Rodrik et al. 2004
and Bosker and Garretsen 2009), we use the best-case scenario institutional quality indices as
proxies for institutions and revisit the institutions hypothesis. The reason we have chosen these
studies is to capture the di¤erent specications that tackled the institutions hypothesis. EL
(2003) pointed out the importance of endowmentsimpact on economic development through
institutions, Rodrik et al. (2004) examined a lager sample and nd that institutions ruleover
geography and international trade for the economic development of a country and BG (2009)
point out the importance of not only a countrys own institutions but also the neighboring
countriesinstitutions as the main determinant of economic development.
The ndings of this paper are as the following. We nd that for di¤erent set of countries,
the equally-weighted institutional quality index does not capture the best-case scenario. One
can construct many other hybrid indices that dominate the equally-weighted governance index.
With the most optimistic view of the relative levels of governance, across countries and over
time, we derive an institutional quality index representing the highest possible governance.
Furthermore, this index as the least volatile both across countries and over time would be less
subject to measurement error. Secondly, those best-case scenario governance indices for each set
of country samples are used as institutional quality proxies to revisit the ndings of the recent
literature. We nd that not only the countrys own and neighboring countries institutions
matter for the long term economic development but also the geography and policies matter
directly. We nd that the valid instrumental variable for institutions will vary with the use of
di¤erent institutional quality proxies and one would need to choose a valid instrument before
proceeding with the application at hand.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the use of world governance
indicators and the debate regarding the use of governance indicators and the purposes that it
serves. In section 3, we examine the main framework of analysis, we dene the notions of
stochastic dominance e¢ ciency and we discuss the general hypothesis for stochastic dominance
of any order. In section 4, we present some simulations to show the importance of the empirical
distribution of components over time for the e¢ ciency of the index. In section 5 we present
an empirical application. We rst look at the data and o¤er descriptive statistics, and we use
the ST methodology to ascertain whether governance composite indices for each indicator over
time are the best-case scenarios with the use of equal weights, or whether we can obtain an
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alternative weighting with the most optimistic weights for each year for the di¤erent constituent
components of the index for each study specic samples. In section 6, after obtaining study
specic best-case institutional quality indices, we revisit the institutions hypothesis in the three
prominent studiesbaseline estimations. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
There has been a vibrant debate on the use, purpose and construction of WGI. The WGI
is used as a composite index of various attributes with xed weights that measure countries
institutional quality. A serious shortcoming is that the construction of all the above hybrid
measures, as in the case of the separate analysis of single attributes, ignores the association
among the various attributes. Another shortcoming for the use of composite indices is the issue
of double counting when the components are highly correlated. When using an equal weights,
composite index with averaging, it may happen that  by combining variables with a high
degree of correlation an element of double counting may be introduced to the index: if two
collinear indicators are included in the composite index with a weight of w1 and w2, the unique
dimension that the two indicators measure would have weight (w1 + w2) in the composite
index. The response has often been to test indicators for statistical correlation using the
Pearson correlation coe¢ cient (Manly, 1994) and choose only indicators which exhibit a low
degree of correlation, e.g. principal component analysis, or to adjust weights correspondingly,
e.g. giving less weight to correlated indicators (Nardo et al. 2005, p. 21). Knack (2006)
points out that the aggregate WGIs are constructed from di¤erent sources by weighting sources
di¤erently where the sources that tend to be more highly correlated with the other sources
are given greater weight. However, Knack (2006) points that the highly correlated sources
getting greater weight is not desirable if the measurement error is correlated among sources (i.e.
measurement errors are not independent). Moreover, since each world governance indicator is
highly correlated with the other ones and each indicator is highly correlated over the years6, it
is suggested that the composite index ranks countries in a manner not dissimilar from the way
any governance indicator ranks them. These correlations would seem to lie at the heart of the
indicated redundancy, both in terms of rankings and values, of the composite indices.
Another shortcoming for WGIs with xed equal weights is measurement error. Both earlier
and currently updated aggregate level of governance indicators have reported margin of errors
6Each aggregate governance indicator is highly correlated with the other aggregate governance
indicators at a given year. Moreover, each governance indicator outcomes at a given year is highly
correlated with the following year outcomes of that indicator. The correlation coe¢ cients, both the
simple and the Spearman-rank one are very high (above 0.9) and very signicant.
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due to permanent measurement errors among all indicators of governance. However, other than
the reported margins of error, there are three other sources of measurement error. First of all,
aggregate governance indicators rely on the perception of governance by the public sector, the
private sector, NGO experts, rms and citizens. Glaeser et al. (2004) point out those governance
indicators are ex-post outcomes, highly correlated with the level of economic development,
rather than political constraints per se. Therefore, WGIs are plagued by recent economic
performances and/or policy rather than being inuenced by actual governance levels. Kurtz and
Schrank (2007) nd that GDP per capita maintains a substantively and statistically important
relationship to government e¤ectiveness and once investment, education, ination and the last
two year rates of economic growth e¤ects are controlled for; government e¤ectiveness no longer
fosters subsequent rates of economic growth. Therefore, both Glaeser et al. (2004) and Kurtz
and Schrank (2007) point out that the economic development of a country had an e¤ect on the
governance indicators, not vice versa.
The second source of measurement error is related to the construction of WGIs over time.
Arndt and Oman (2006), and Knack (2006) indicate that comparisons cannot be made since
WGIs are scaled to have zero mean and one standard deviation at a given year. As more
countries are covered over time and all aggregate governance indicators are standardized to have
a zero mean and unit standard deviation for a certain year, there is a need for adjustments to
earlier periods to maintain the zero mean and unit standard deviation. As a result, changes in
scores over time are related to updating scores rather than actual improvements or deteriorations
in governance. Moreover, Knack (2006) suggests that updating governance scores to maintain
the zero mean and unit variance is the source of the change of the relative rankings of the
counties.
The third source of the measurement error is that the individual disaggregated data are
di¤erent for each country over time and updating scores will make the di¤erent data sources
become more correlated with each other over time and as such they will result in weights that
will produce ine¢ cient xed weight indices of the aggregate level of governance, as the latter
will become more variable. Knack (2006) state that indicators for 2002 and 2004 are based on
the same set of sources for only 4 of the 27 countries in Eastern European and Central Asia
(ECA) counties, therefore the comparison between two countries or a country over time may
be based on a totally independent source of data and the changes in scores over time may be
caused by the correction of the scores over time. Therefore, Knack (2006) investigates the e¤ect
of updating scores on Eastern Europe and Central Asia countries and nds that updating scores
will make the di¤erent data sources become more correlated with each other over time.
In this paper, we question the use of composite governance indices in the empirical growth
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literature (e.g. averaging governance levels over time for each respective indicator). As gov-
ernance levels for all indicators are highly correlated over time, assigning equal weights to
governance levels of each year might produce a double counting problem. Moreover, it is im-
portant to deal with the presence of measurement error as it creates high variability for the
xed weight indices. If the governance levels for a given indicator are highly correlated over
time, more weight should be given to a governance level of a particular year that has a di¤erent
empirical distribution function (i.e. governance levels of that year release di¤erent information
than the ones of other years) and that is also the least volatile one over time (i.e. governance
levels of that year are less subject to score updating and measurement error). KKM (2007b)
claim that particular weights given to di¤erent sources in order to construct the aggregate in-
dicators do not make a signicant di¤erence in overall estimates of governance. However, this
claim is not true for the use of composite indices of aggregate indicators. We will show empiri-
cally that the equally-weighted composite indices are not the best-case scenarios and there are
many alternative composite indices that dominate the equally-weighted ones.
3 SD E¢ ciency Testing
We consider a strictly stationary process fY t; t 2 Zg taking values in Rn. The observations
consist of a realization of fY t; t = 1; :::; Tg. These data correspond to observed values of the
given governance indicators levels over time (i.e. nine di¤erent given governance indicator levels
over time, e.g. VA in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007). We denote by
F (y), the continuous cdf of Y = (Y1; :::; Yn)0 at point y = (y1; :::; yn)0. Let us consider a hybrid
composite index with a weighting vector  2 L where L := f 2 Rn+ : e0 = 1g with e being a
vector of ones. This means that all the di¤erent year outcomes of the given governance indicator
have positive weights and that these weights sum up to one. Let us denote by G(z;;F ) the
cdf of the hybrid index value 0Y at point z given by G(z;;F ) :=
Z
Rn
If0u  zgdF (u):
3.1 Tests for SD E¢ ciency of di¤erent indices
SDE is a direct extension of SD to the case where full diversication is allowed. In that
setting we derive statistics to test for SDE of the equally-weighted governance composite index
(with the vector of equal weights denoted by  ) with respect to all possible combinations of
weighting schemes () constructed from the set of year outcomes of given governance indicator.7
7We have dened above  and  to be di¤erent weighting vectors that are associated with di¤erent
indices. In the discussion that follows we use  and  interchangeably with the index that they
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In this paper we test whether the use of equally-weighted governance indicator,  , is the best-
case scenario, in the sense that it gives the maximum value and lower variability of measured
governance levels across countries and over time or whether we can construct another composite
index  (alternative weighting scheme) from the set of year outcome levels that dominates it.
The distribution of the hybrid index  dominates the distribution of the index  stochas-
tically at rst-order (SD1) if, for any argument z; G(z;  ;F )  G(z;;F ). If z denotes a
governance level, then the inequality in the denition means that the proportion of countries
in distribution  with value of governance smaller than z is not larger than the proportion of
such countries in  . In other words, there is at least as high a proportion of governance in  as
in  . If the composite index  dominates the index  at rst order, then there are always more
countries having relative levels of governance below a given governance level, z, in  than in ,
so that  achieves higher relative levels of measured governance for more observations than  .
The objective function that we use is the following:
Max
z;
[G(z;  ;F ) G(z;;F )]
The above maximization results in the best-case scenario (most optimistic) governance index
 constructed from the set of year outcomes of that governance indicator in the sense that
it reaches the highest level of measured governance for a given probability, implying that the
number of observations having a relative governance level above a given argument z is maxi-
mized.
As pointed out in Pinar et al. (2013), it is worth mentioning that SD is considerably more
general than mean-variance analysis (MVA) which only looks at the rst two moments of the
two distributions under comparison. On the other hand, Post (2003) suggested that the MVA
is consistent with expected utility theory if and only if investor preferences and/or empirical
distributions obey certain conditions. On the other hand the SDE methodology allows for full
diversication considering all moments and therefore o¤ers more robust ndings. Moreover,
SDE has additional advantages over MVA as the latter allows for possible trade-o¤between two
moments and might classify inferior portfolios as e¢ cient and ine¢ cient portfolios as optimal
(see e.g. Post and Versijb 2007). Therefore, the MVA analysis only looks into a dominant
relation with a higher mean and lower variance, whereas the SDE methods consider all possible
moments. Only in the case where one compares two normal distributions does SD reduce to
mean-variance analysis. This is also true for PCA which is based on the consideration of the
second moment alone after standardizing for a common mean. However, the assumption of
represent.
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normality for each component is di¢ cult to support empirically. In contrast, SD analysis takes
into account the whole distribution, not only the mean and the variance. Hence, one could
expect signicant di¤erences between the SD e¢ cient index and the mean-variance e¢ cient
index when more realistic assumptions are made concerning the distributions of the di¤erent
components. SD is attractive because it is e¤ectively nonparametric as no explicit specication
of a utility function or probability distribution functional form is required (Post 2003; Post
and Versijb 2007; Wong et al. 2008; Scaillet and Topaloglou 2010). In addition, the entire
probability density function is taken into account rather than a nite number of moments so it
can be considered less restrictive and more robust.
When studying governance measures, certain criteria need to be satised. The SD1 criterion
corresponds to all types of utility functions as long as they are non-decreasing in governance
levels. SD1 only relies on the fact that people are rational in the sense that they prefer more
rather than less governance (also known as the monotonicity axiom). Therefore, a sensible
aggregate measure should increase in any indicator which is a social good, and decrease in
any indicator which represents a social bad. Accordingly, for aggregate governance indices
containing only social goodindicators (i.e. di¤erent set of governance measures), one hybrid
outcome as expressed by the index  should be ranked higher than that of another hybrid
outcome expressed by the index  if at least one country is better o¤ in  than in  , and no
one is worse o¤. So, SD1 of  by  means that  corresponds to a higher measured relative
governance than  .
When there is no governance index  that dominates the given index  at rst-order, we
move to the SD2 criterion. The objective function that we use is the following:
Max
z;
Z z
 1
G(u;  ;F )du 
Z z
 1
G(u;;F )du
This maximization results in the best-case governance index  constructed from the set of year
outcomes of a given governance indicator in the sense that it also gives the greatest value of
governance for a given probability.
Overall, the ST methodology ensures the regularity conditions of nonsatiation (rst-order
SDE) and risk aversion (second-order SDE). The best-case scenario must be rst-order sto-
chastic dominance e¢ cient for all governance indicators that use a nonsatiable decision maker
(see Fishburn 1974; Bawa et al. 1985; Post 2003; Kuosmanen 2004; Scaillet and Topaloglou
2010 among many others) which is appropriate for both risk averse and risk lover individu-
als as utility function may have concave and convex segments respectively. In other words,
rst-order SDE is more general as it corresponds to all types of utility functions as long as
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they are non-decreasing. We rst test for rst-order SDE of the equally-weighted governance
index to ascertain whether it is a best-case scenario governance index or whether there exists
alternative weighting schemes that dominate it. Therefore, rst-order dominance will suggest
whether the equally-weighted index constitutes a rational choice or not. If it is dominated by
alternative weight schemes, then it will never be chosen independently of whether the decision
maker is risk averse, risk neutral or risk lover. If there is no alternative weighting scheme, ,
that dominates the equally-weighted one,  , we move to the second-order SDE that allows for
a nonsatiable and additionally risk-averse decision maker which permits a selection of weights
for the best-case scenario.
We can further dene for z 2 R:
J1(z;;F ) := G(z;;F );
J2(z;;F ) :=
Z z
 1
G(u;;F )du =
Z z
 1
J1(u;;F )du;
J3(z;;F ) :=
Z z
 1
Z u
 1
G(v;;F )dvdu =
Z z
 1
J2(u;;F )du;
and so on.
From Davidson and Duclos (2000) Equation (2), we know that
Jj(z;;F ) =
Z z
 1
1
(j   1)!(z   u)
j 1dG(u;; F );
which can be rewritten as
Jj(z;;F ) =
Z
Rn
1
(j   1)!(z   
0u)j 1If0u  zgdF (u):
The general hypotheses for testing SDE of order j of  , hereafter SDEj, can be written
compactly as:
Hj0 :Jj(z;  ;F )  Jj(z;;F )for all z 2 R and for all 2 L;
Hj1 :Jj(z;  ;F ) > Jj(z;;F )for some z 2 R or for some 2 L:
Under the null hypothesis Hj0 there is no governance index  constructed from the set of year
outcomes of a given governance indicator that dominates the given equally-weighted index
 (i.e. equally-weighted year outcomes of a given governance indicator) at order j. In this
case, the function Jj(z;  ;F ) is always lower than the function Jj(z;;F ) for all possible
12
hybrid indices  for any argument z. Under the alternative hypothesis Hj1 , we can construct
a governance index  that for some arguments z, the function Jj(z;  ;F ) is greater than the
function Jj(z;;F ). In other words, the main focus of the hypotheses is to test the e¢ ciency of
the equally-weighted index (i.e. whether the equally-weighted index is the best-case scenario at
all levels of governance). If the null is rejected, then the evaluated index (i.e. equally-weighted
index) is not the best-case scenario.
We consider the weighted Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test statistic
S^ :=
p
T sup
z;
h
Jj(z;  ; F^ )  Jj(z;; F^ )
i
;
and a test based on the decision rule:
reject Hj0 if S^j > cj ;
where cj is some critical value (see section 2 of Scaillet and Topaloglou 2010 for the derivation of
the test). In order to make the result operational, we need to nd an appropriate critical value
cj. Since the distribution of the test statistic depends on the underlying distribution, we rely on
block bootstrap methods to simulate p-values. The use of block bootstrapping is designed for
time series applications and we used block bootstrap in the present case to guard the ndings
against the time dependence of the panel structure; however, di¤erent set of bootstrapping
approaches could also be employed in future studies to account for panel dependence.8
We derive statistics to test for SDE of the equally-weighted governance index with respect
to all possible combinations of weighting schemes constructed from the set of year outcomes
of a given governance indicator. In the next section, before moving to the empirical analy-
sis of WGIs, we present some simulation experiments to evaluate the importance of di¤erent
distributional component characteristics in the derivation of best-case scenario weights.
4 Simulations
We present some simulations to demonstrate the importance of empirical distribution of com-
ponents over time. We present simulation results for two di¤erent experiments. In each case
we have six di¤erent components (e.g. those components could be considered as governance
levels of a given indicator over a six year period) and all of them are normally distributed as in
8Test statistics are obtained for di¤erent governance levels considering all possible weight combi-
nations which require mixed integer and linear programming for the rst- and second-order SDE test
statistics. See section 4 of the ST for the mathematical formulation details.
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the case of the construction of each governance indicator at a given period. Then those com-
ponents are used to construct the equally-weighted composite index by using 500 observations.
The simulation results are reported in Table 1.
In the rst experiment, we simulate six components which are normally distributed with
each component having di¤erent mean, 0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05 and 0 respectively and same
standard deviation, 1, and we proceed to construct an equally-weighted composite index from
these simulated components. The results of the rst panel of Table 1, show that there are 494
composite indices for a given zpoint that dominate the equally-weighted composite index
and it is clear that the highest mean component has the greatest impact. In that case, the
highest mean components weight (the rst component) from these 494 dominant indices is on
average 0.422. On the other hand the other components with respective means 0.2, 0.15, 0.1,
0.05 and 0 have weights 0.285, 0.122, 0.068, 0.062 and 0.041 respectively. The above simulation
results suggest that using the equally weighted composite index is not the best-case scenario
index and it is dominated by many other potential component indices with di¤erent weights.
One can see that when the means of each component are di¤erent, with the same standard
deviations, the component with highest mean has the greatest impact in the construction of
the best-case index. In the second and third cases in the rst panel, where we decrease the
mean di¤erences among the components (e.g. in the second case, the gap between means is
0.03 and in the third case, this gap is 0.01), we can see that the component with the highest
mean has the greatest impact in the construction of the best-case index, however, this impact
decreases as the gap between the means of the di¤erent components decreases. Similarly, when
the mean gap between components decreases, the weight assigned to each component is getting
closer to each other. Finally, for the fourth case, we have six components which are normally
distributed and all have same mean of 0and same standard deviation of 1. There is no
composite index for a given z point that dominates the equally-weighted composite index
where we can conclude that the average weighting is the best-case scenario. Therefore, when
the means are close to each other and each component has the same variability as any other,
the equally-weighted index becomes the best-case scenario since each component will have the
same empirical distribution and will contribute equally to the composite index. Since the index
is bounded between -2.5 and +2.5, the higher mean component has the least standard deviation
in the upper tails. Therefore, not only the component with higher mean is getting more weight
but also does the component which is least variant.
In the second experiment, we allow the six components to have the same mean values
(i.e. 0), but some of them have di¤erent standard deviations. In the rst case of the second
experiment, we allow some of the components to have di¤erent standard deviations (i.e. each
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components standard deviation is set to be 1, 1, 1, 0.8, 0.5 and 0.2 respectively). The results
of the rst case of this experiment show that there are 41 composite indices for a given z
point that dominate the equally-weighted composite index and it is clear that the least variable
component has the greatest impact. In that case, the least variable components weight (the
last component) from these 41 dominant indices is on average 0.384. In the third case, we allow
some of the components to have di¤erent means and di¤erent standard deviations. First three
variables have one standard deviation and last three variables have 0.8 standard deviation.
First and fourth variable, second and fth variable, third and sixth variable have mean values
0.2, 0 and -0.2 respectively. In that case, the component with higher mean and least standard
deviation has the highest weight in the construction of the best-case scenario. The highest mean
and least variable components weight (the fourth component) is on average 0.394. Moreover,
the component with lowest mean and highest standard deviation has the lowest weight in the
construction of the best-case scenario. The lowest mean and most variable components weight
(the third component) is on average 0.053. There is a trade o¤ between mean and variance.
For example, the second and fth components have the same mean but fth component has
lower standard deviation than the second component. The gap between the rst and second
components weights in the construction of the best-case scenario index is 0.154, but the gap
between the weights of the rst and fth component is 0.12.
Overall, we nd that under normality, when all components have di¤erent means but the
same standard deviation, the component with the highest mean has the greatest impact (weight)
in the construction of the best-case index. When the gap between the means of the di¤erent
components decreases, then the weights of these components become similar to each other.
Finally, if all components have the same distribution (i.e. zero mean and a variance of one),
then averaging the components is the best-case scenario since all distribution of components is
equally informative and there is no other weighting scheme that dominates the given index. On
the other hand, when each component has the same mean and di¤erent standard deviations,
then the least variable component has the greatest impact in the construction of the best-
case scenario index. When both mean and standard deviations vary, then the component
with the highest mean and the lowest variability relative to the other components has the
greatest impact in the construction of the most optimistic index. There is a trade o¤ between
mean and standard deviation and in the case where one component has the highest mean and
highest standard deviation and the other component has the second highest mean but the least
variability, then the gap between the componentsweights will be less in the construction of
the best-case scenario index.
The SD approach maximizes the distributional distance between the given (equally-weighted)
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index and any possible alternative. In comparing distributions, we know that the mean plays
the key role, followed by variability. The mean indicates the better governance level o¤ered,
while the standard deviation shows the volatility of the governance level. The best-case scenario
index obtained from the SDE approach is the one that o¤ers the greatest governance level over
time and at the same time exhibits discernibly the most stable governance level.
5 Empirical Application
5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use the World Banks World Governance Indicators (see KKM, 2008 where the units of the
aggregate governance indicators will be those of a standard normal random variable, i.e. with
zero mean, unit standard deviation, and ranging approximately from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher
scores corresponding to better governance). The mean of the governance estimates for each
indicator at a given year is set to zero, and the standard deviation is one. In particular, for
each indicator at a given year, KKM (2008) subtract the sample mean (across countries) from
each country, and divide by the sample standard deviation (across countries).
Each governance indicator composite index represents the simple arithmetic average of the
nine year entry of that indicator:
Indicator composite indexI = I1996+I1998+I2000+I2002+I2003+I2004+I2005+I2006+I20079
while I = V A; PS;GE;RQ;RL;CC
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for each individual governance indicator over time
and the equally-weighted composite index obtained by averaging the governance levels over
time. One can see that each indicator composite index has lower standard deviation than the
standard deviation of the indicator at a given year as expected. However, in order to have a
balanced data set, countries that do not have all components for any given year need to be
excluded from the analysis. Therefore, even though the original indicators are constructed to
preserve the zero mean and unit standard deviation for the full sample size, in practice when
certain countries are selected for a specic study and some observations are excluded to form
a balanced data set, the distribution of indicators no longer has the property of zero mean
and unit standard deviation. In the next section, we will examine the e¢ ciency results for
equally-weighted governance indices for each study specic sample size.
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5.2 Results for the e¢ ciency of the equally-weighted governance
indices
In this section, we provide the results of the SD e¢ ciency tests. We nd that the equally-
weighted index is not the best-case scenario for all di¤erent sample sizes as there are alternative
weighting schemes at di¤erent governance levels that dominate the evaluated index. Therefore,
it is clear that the equally-weighted index is not the best-case scenario index for di¤erent sample
sizes. Below, we will o¤er the results for each sample case and give the best-case scenario for
each sample, and also provide comparisons between the equally-weighted index (i.e. evaluated
index) and the proposed best-case scenario index for all sample cases.
In the EL (2003) study, the sample size is 72 countries. Table 3A summarizes the results
when equally-weighted governance indices (i.e. evaluated composite VA, PS, GE, RQ, RL and
CC indices which are averaged over time) are tested. The rst column of Table 3A o¤ers the
governance indicator that is being evaluated, whereas the second panel gives the number of
countries that have a balanced data set for the sample. After conducting tests, we nd that
the over time equally-weighted index for each governance indicator is not the best-case scenario
as there are many other indices  consisting of the nine years that dominate the evaluated
composite index. For each governance level, z, there is an alternative weighting sheme that
results in the best-case scenario for that given governance level.
To derive a weighting scheme that is the best-case scenario, we average the dominating
weighting schemes that are found for di¤erent z levels. In order to test whether these proposed
best-case scenarios are best cases, we implemented the proposed test for these rst-stage best-
case scenarios.9 The rst-stage best-case scenarios are also dominated by alternative schemes
but fewer times (i.e. rst-stage best-case scenario is a better case for more governance levels
when compared to the equally-weighted one). Therefore, we continue implementing iterations
of testing the best-case scenarios. The third column of Table 3A o¤ers the number of itera-
tions took to reach the best-case scenarios for each governance level. On average, it takes 5-6
iterations to reach the best-case scenario for a given governance indicator. After implement-
ing iterations of the test, we nd the best-case scenario for each governance level that is not
dominated by any alternative weighting scheme. For example, the best-case VA index is ob-
tained when governance levels in 1996 and 2004 are weighted by 96.5% and 3.5% respectively.
Similarly, the best-case scenario weighting schemes for the remaining governance indicators are
given in each row of Table 3A for the EL (2003) sample.
To make the results with the best-case scenario more apparent, we o¤er comparisons between
9We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to test for the rst-stage best-case scenarios.
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the evaluated index (i.e. equally-weighted governance index) and the best-case scenarios for each
governance indicator in Table 3B. We provide comparisons between the evaluated and the best-
case scenarios for the rst three quartiles of the empirical distribution of the evaluated index.
The second column o¤ers the governance levels of the equally-weighted index at these rst three
quartiles. Finally, the last two columns o¤er the number of observations that are above these
governance levels at di¤erent quartiles. For example, there are 56, 37, and 19 countries above
-0.872, -0.220, and 0.329 governance levels with the equally-weighted VA index. However, there
are always more countries above these governance levels with the best-case scenario weighting
scheme (57, 38 and 21 countries respectively). Similarly, Table 3B o¤ers the comparison between
the evaluated and best-case scenario index for the remaining governance indicators.
Moving to the Rodrik et al. (2004) study, there are three di¤erent sample sizes that are used,
namely the Acemoglu sample, the extended Acemoglu sample and a larger sample with each
sample having 64, 79 and 137 countries respectively. For all these sample sizes, we nd that
the equally-weighted indicator index is not the best-case governance index for each governance
indicator. Tables 4A, 5A, and 6A o¤er the best-case weighting schemes for each governance
indicator for each sample with 64, 79, and 137 countries respectively. Similar to that of Table
3A, we o¤er the number of countries for each application and the number of iterations of testing
employed to obtain the best-case scenarios. Tables 4B, 5B, and 6B o¤er the comparisons
between evaluated and the best-case scenarios for the rst three quartiles of the empirical
distribution of the evaluated index. We nd that there are always more countries that are
above a given governance level with the best-case scenario when compared with the evaluated
index.
Lastly, the BG (2009) paper uses two di¤erent samples. One sample is used for choosing
the instrumental variable and consists of 79 countries. The other sample is used for baseline
estimation and consists of 147 countries. We also nd that the equally-weighted indicator
index is not the best-case governance index for each governance indicator. Tables 7A and
8A summarize the best-case scenario weighting schemes for each governance indicator for the
79 and 147-country samples. Tables 7B and 8B o¤er the comparisons between the evaluated
index and the best-case scenario index when the number of countries (observations) above a
given governance level is given for the rst three quartiles of the empirical distribution of the
evaluated index. We nd that the best-case scenario indices for each governance level result in
a higher number countries achieving higher governance levels.
The above results suggest that using the equally-weighted index is not the best-case scenario
because it is stochastic e¢ ciently dominated by many other potential composite indices with
di¤erent weights for each year of a given governance indicator. We nd that di¤erent years
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contribute di¤erently to the construction of the most optimistic governance index. In the next
section, we revisit the ndings of the three prominent studies by using the best-case scenario
indices as a proxy for the institutional quality.10
It is important to point out that the weights assigned to each year for each governance
indicator and the degree of e¢ ciency may change over time as pointed out by Post (2003).
Firstly, with the additional releases of WGIs, the weights assigned to each year for each re-
spective governance index might change. The best-case governance indices for any given set
of countries, i.e. best-case governance indices for the pre-determined samples, can vary over
time. Secondly, if di¤erent sample sizes are used, each year might yield di¤erent weights for
the best-case scenario governance indices. Therefore, the weights assigned to each year for the
best-case governance indices need to be re-estimated periodically.11
6 Revisiting the Institutions Hypothesis
6.1 Case 1: Easterly and Levine (2003)
EL (2003) nd that geographic endowments explain economic development through their impact
on institutions but do not have direct impact on economic development. On the other side,
EL found no impact of policies on economic development once institutions are controlled for.
The main question that we pose here is the following: Are the ndings of the EL study still
valid once we use our proposed best-case governance indices as proxies for institutional quality
and/or are there some di¤erences? Do policies matter once we use our proxies for institutional
quality? Do endowments a¤ect economic development directly or through channels other than
their impact on institutions?
We nd that when the best-case governance indices are used as institutional quality proxy,
institutions are still signicant after controlling for legal origin, religion and ethnolinguistic
10The next sections summarize the ndings of the three studies when the best-case scenario gov-
ernance indices are used as institutional proxies. However, detailed ndings of the three studies are
available upon request from the author.
11To assess the robustness of the ndings in the next sections, we also test whether the equally-
weighted governance indices are the best-case scenario indices or not for the full sample size which
consists around 200 observations. We nd that the equally-weighted indices are not the best-case
scenarios for all governance indices when the full sample size is used. Even though weights assigned to
each year in the case of full sample size di¤er from the ones that are found with di¤erent sample sizes,
the ndings that are presented in the next sections do not change signicantly when the best-case
scenario governance indices for the full sample size are used as institutional proxies. Especially, the
di¤erent results with the revisited papers still hold when the best-case scenario indices for the full
sample size are used. Full sample size best-case scenario governance indices and detailed ndings of
three studies with those indices are available upon request from the author.
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diversity and use of di¤erent endowments as instruments. However, over-identication tests o¤er
di¤erent results compared with those in the EL Table 4. We do nd that the data sometimes
reject the hypothesis that endowments only explain the economic development through their
ability to explain institutional development. Therefore, once some of the best-case governance
indices are used as institution index, endowments are not valid instruments and endowments
do explain economic development through other channels rather than institutions alone.
In their Table 5, EL further control for the main macroeconomic policies (i.e. ination,
real exchange rate overvaluation and trade openness) and nd that only institutions are the
main signicant variable. Once we use best-case scenario institutional quality indices, we nd
that the institutions are still signicant. Therefore, our ndings with the best-case scenario
indices still favor the institutions approach. However, we also nd that policies do matter.
Ination, trade openness, real exchange rate overvaluation enter signicantly in the regressions.
Ination enters with the wrongsign, but trade openness and real exchange rate overvaluation
enter signicantly and with the correctsign. Once some of the best-case institutional quality
indices are used, trade openness has a positive impact and overvaluation has a negative impact
on development. On the other side, we also nd that once the most optimistic institutional
quality indices are used, in some cases, the over-identication test is rejected, so settler mortality
and latitude do explain economic development through other channels that are di¤erent from
the institutions.
In Table 6 of EL (2003), they nd that institutions are still signicant and none of the policy
variables enter the regressions signicantly at 10% level when policies are treated as endoge-
nous variables. However, we nd that for some specications, once our proposed institutional
quality indices are used, institutions are not signicant any more, something that contradicts
the institutions hypothesis. On the other side, we nd that trade openness a¤ects economic
development signicantly. When institutions and trade openness are used in the regressions,
we found that once the best-case PS indices are used as proxy for institutional quality, trade
openness is signicant at 10% level. Moreover, when institutions, trade openness, religion and
French legal origin are used in the regressions, we nd that trade openness signicantly a¤ects
development when the best-case PS and VA institutional quality indices are used.
Finally, when the institution index and trade openness are used in the regressions, we nd
that once the best-case GE, RL and CC indices are used as a proxy for the institutions, the
over-identication test is rejected at the 5% level. Moreover, when the institutions and the real
exchange rate overvaluation are used in the regressions, we nd that the over-identication test
is also rejected at the 5% level when the best-case GE, RL and CC indices are used. Over-
identication test rejection means that endowments do explain economic development through
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other channels that are di¤erent than institutions alone and therefore they cannot act as valid
instrumental variables for institutions.
6.1.1 Case 2: Rodrik et al. (2004)
Rodrik et al. (2004) investigate the contributions of the deep determinants of economic de-
velopment, namely geography, institutions and international trade to income level di¤erences
around the world. Rodrik et al. (2004) nd that institutions trumpssince institutions have
a direct impact on economic development with di¤erent sample sizes and specications. Once
institutions are controlled for, geography has indirect e¤ect on economic development through
its impact on institutions. On the other hand, once institutions are controlled for, international
trade is always insignicant and with the wrongsign.
Rodrik et al. (2004) di¤ers from the EL (2003) study in a couple of ways. Firstly, Rodrik et
al. (2004) have larger sample sizes (79 and 137 countries) whereas EL (2003) only consider 72
countries. Secondly, Rodrik et al. (2004) consider international trade in their main estimation,
but EL (2003) did not test its impact on economic development (see footnote 3 in Rodrik et al.
2004 for further details).
In the Rodrik et al. (2004) study, geography is treated as an exogenous variable and
measured by absolute latitude. Institution is treated as an endogenous variable and is measured
with the rule of law in 2000, taken from world governance indicators. Depending on the sample
size, settler mortality (sample with 64 and 79 countries) or percentage of population speaking
English and percentage of population speaking European language (sample of 137 countries)
are used as instrumental variable(s) for the institutions. Finally, international trade is treated
as an endogenous variable and is measured as the ratio of trade to GDP. Predicted trade shares
from Frankel and Romer (1999) are used as an instrumental variable for international trade.
Since the Rodrik et al. (2004) paper uses scores of the rule of law 2000 from world governance
indicators as an institution proxy, the main questions that we pose are: Are the ndings of the
Rodrik et al. (2004) still valid once we use our proposed best-case scenario indices as proxies
for institutional quality and/or are there some di¤erences? Do institutions trumpafter all?
Does geography or international trade have a direct impact on economic development?
In their baseline ndings, Table 3 of Rodrik et al. (2004), they nd that the institutions
trumpwith di¤erent specications and sample sizes. On the other hand, when the best-case
scenario of governance indices are used, for the samples of 64-countries and 79-countries, except
for the best-case PS index, all most optimistic institutional quality indices conrm the ndings
of Rodrik et al. (2004), where institutions trumpover integration and geography. Once the
best-case PS index is used as a proxy for institutions, the institutions are not signicant for the
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64- and 79-country case which contradicts the institutions hypothesis. Moreover, we nd that
Rodrik et al. (2004) ndings for the large sample are not robust when some of the best-case
governance indices are used as institutional proxy. We nd that geography has a direct impact
on economic development once the most optimistic VA and RQ indices are used as a proxy which
is consistent with the geography approach. Geography has not only an indirect e¤ect through
institutions but also has a direct impact on economic development. Finally, unlike the Rodrik
et al. (2004) ndings, when the best-case VA, PS and RQ institutional quality indices are used,
the over-identication test is not rejected at the 10% level for the large sample, which means
that percentage of population speaking English and percentage speaking European language
are valid instruments for the institutions. Since both instruments are valid for some best-case
institutional quality indices, then one can exploit the ndings in the large sample case. In
the Rodrik et al. (2004) ndings, the large sample ndings are ignored since in their case the
instruments were not passing the over-identication test. However, when the best-case VA and
RQ indices are used, not only are instruments valid for the large sample but also geography
has a direct impact on economic development, something that favors the geography approach.
Following Rodrik et al. (2004) Table 4, Rodrik et al. examined the inter-relations between
institutions and international trade for the samples of 79-countries and 137-countries. Rodrik
et al. (2004) nd that for the 79-country sample, geography a¤ects institutions signicantly
and positively. Countries that are in higher latitudes trade less and countries that have better
institutions trade more. On the other side, for the large sample case, the only signicant IV
estimate is that geography a¤ects institutions signicantly and positively. When the majority
of the best-case institutional quality indices are used, our ndings conrm Rodrik et al. (2004)
ndings. However, we have two major di¤erences from their ndings. Firstly, once the best-case
PS index is used, then international trade does a¤ect institutions signicantly and positively
for the 79-country sample. Secondly, once the best-case VA index is used, institutions are not
signicant any more in a¤ecting international trade for the 79-country sample.
6.1.2 Case 3: Bosker and Garretsen (2009)
BG (2009) mainly concentrated on absolute geography, measured as the absolute latitude of a
country; institutions of a country, measured with the rule of law in 2000 from world governance
indicators; institutions of neighboring countries, measured as the average of institution proxy
for neighboring countries. BG (2009) nd that it is not only the countrys own institutions that
matter for economic development but also the neighboring countriesinstitutions are important
for development of that country.
In the BG (2009) study, the countrys own institution proxy and the neighboring countries
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institutions are treated as an endogenous variable; therefore, at least two instrumental vari-
ables are needed for instrumental variable estimation.12 There are three possible instrumental
variables suggested by the literature, settler mortality rate (available only for 79 countries),
percentage of population speaking English and percentage of population speaking a European
language (sample of 147 countries). In order to exploit the larger sample case, BG (2009) uses
percentage of population speaking European language as a valid instrument for institutions
(see section 3.3 and Appendix B of the BG study for detailed procedure of the choice of the in-
strumental variable). Once the percentage of population speaking a European language is used
as an instrument for institutions, BG (2009) nd that not only the countrys own institutions
that matter for economic development but also the neighboring countriesinstitutions as well.
Absolute geography on the other hand has an indirect e¤ect on economic development through
its e¤ect on institutions.
Since the BG (2009) paper uses scores of the rule of law in 2000 from the world governance
indicators as an institutional proxy, the questions we pose are the following: Are the ndings
of BG (2009) still valid once we use our proposed best-case scenario indices as proxies for in-
stitutional quality and/or are there some di¤erences? Is the percentage of population speaking
European language still a valid instrument or is it valid to use other instruments? Do institu-
tions of a country or neighboring institutions matter for economic development after all? Does
geography have a direct impact on economic development?
First, we examine the choice of the instrumental variable. When the majority of the best-case
governance indices are used as proxies for institutions, our ndings conrm BG (2009) ndings
that the percentage of population speaking a European language is a valid instrument. However,
we nd that di¤erent instruments are valid once we use some other best-case governance indices
as proxies for institutional quality. Firstly, when we use the best-case VA, PS and RQ indices
as institutional quality proxies, we nd that using both the percentage of population speaking
English and the percentage of speaking a European language are valid instruments since over-
identication tests are not rejected. On the other hand, using all possible three instruments
together is a valid option when the best-case PS and RQ governance indices are used.
With the 147-country sample, when the best-case VA, PS and RQ indices are used, both
language instruments are valid. For the remaining best-case institutional quality indices, us-
ing the percentage of population speaking European language is a valid instrument. Overall,
the validity of instruments changes depending on which best-case governance index is used.
12BG (2009) cited Rodrik et al. (2004) paper that the available language instruments for large
sample do not pass over-identication test, whereas in the previous section, we nd that the language
instruments are valid for some of the best-case institutional quality indices. However, we continue
with BG specication.
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Using the percentage of population speaking European language is not always valid and the
percentage of population speaking English is also a valid instrument when some of the best-case
institutional quality indices are used.
Finally, we replicate the baseline ndings of the BG paper (see Table 3 of BG paper for their
baseline ndings). Our ndings conrm BG (2009) ndings that a countrys own institutions as
well as neighboring countriesinstitutions matter for the development of a country and absolute
geography, climate or disease environment, have an indirect e¤ect on economic development
through their e¤ect on institutions when the majority of the best-case scenario indices are used
as institution proxies. However, when the best-case RQ and VA institutional quality indices are
used and the countrys own institutions are accounted for, the absolute geography has a direct
e¤ect on economic development. On the other hand, when a countrys own institutions and
neighboring countriesinstitutions are accounted for and the best-case VA institutional quality
index is used, geography has a direct e¤ect on economic development.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we conduct consistent tests for stochastic dominance e¢ ciency at any order
of a given equally-weighted index for each governance indicator when it is compared to all
possible governance indices constructed from over time levels of governance. We nd that the
equally-weighted indicator composite indices (i.e. average of each specic governance indicator
over time) are not the best-case scenarios for governance. We nd that each year contributes
di¤erently in the construction of the most optimistic governance indices for each governance
measure for each specic sample of countries used in empirical literature (Easterly and Levine
2003; Rodrik et al. 2004; and Bosker and Garretsen 2009).
Moreover, we use the best-case scenario indices as proxies for institutional quality to check
for robustness of the results obtained in three prominent applications where the best-case indices
are used to assess the link between economic development and institutional quality. With some
of the best-case scenario institutional quality proxies, we conrm the ndings of the EL (2003)
study. However, for some other best-case institutional quality indices, the EL (2003) ndings
are not robust. We nd that for some specications, the institutions are not signicant when
the most optimistic governance indices are used, something that contradicts the institutions
hypothesis. We also nd that policies do matter for certain specications once some of the best-
case institutional quality indices are used. Moreover, endowments are not valid instruments for
institutions for all of the best-case institutional quality indices, since we nd that endowments
do a¤ect economic development through channels that are di¤erent than institutional quality.
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For the Rodrik et al. (2004) paper, for the samples of 64-countries and 79-countries, we
conrm the ndings of Rodrik et al. (2004), where institutions trumpover integration and
geography with the exception of the best-case PS index. When the best-case PS index is
used, institutions are not signicant for the 64 and 79-country samples, a contradiction of
the institutions hypothesis. Overall, when some of the best-case institutional quality indices
are used, the Rodrik et al. (2004) ndings for the large sample case are not robust. We
nd that once the best-case VA and RQ indices are used, geography has a direct impact on
economic development which is consistent with the geography approach. Geography has not
only an indirect e¤ect through institutions but also a direct impact on economic development.
Moreover, we nd that the percentage of population speaking English and the percentage of
population speaking European language are valid instruments for institutions for the large
sample when some of the best-case institutional quality indices are used.
Finally, when the best-case indices are used as institutional quality proxies, our ndings
conrm the BG (2009) ndings. A countrys own institutions as well as neighboring countries
institutions matter for the development of that country and absolute geography has an indirect
e¤ect on economic development through their e¤ect on institutions. However, once the best-case
VA index is used, we nd that absolute geography has a direct e¤ect on economic development.
Moreover, we nd that validity of the instruments used depends on the choice of the best-case
scenario index used.
Overall, with many of the best-case scenarios of the institutional quality indices, we con-
rm the ndings in the literature that the institutional quality of a country and that of its
neighboring countries are the primary reason for economic development and geography has an
indirect e¤ect on economic development through its impact on institutions. However, there are
certain cases where we nd that not only the countrys own and neighboring institutions mat-
ter for economic development but also geography and policies do matter directly for economic
development. Finally, valid instruments for institutions vary with the use of di¤erent best-case
institutional quality indices. One has to be careful with using instruments for institutions since
the results vary with di¤erent institutional quality indices. Moreover, instruments used in liter-
ature are not valid for some cases and instruments which are considered as not being valid are
actually found to be valid. One can see that the ndings in the literature for the institutional
hypothesis are fragile, and therefore more careful research is needed to be taken before policy
recommendations are made.
As it was suggested by a referee, there is a methodological caveat with our approach in
that we test the standard benchmark of equal weights as adopted and applied in the literature.
Yet, the dominating indices when averaged to form a new optimal indexmay generally be
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dominated by some other combinations. To improve on that, one can use the e¢ ciency tests
by Post (2003), Kuosmanen (2004), Kopa and Chovanec (2008), and Kopa and Post (2011) to
identify a dominating alternative. We leave that interesting approach for future research.
Finally, it is important to note that WGIs are updated every year and some earlier gov-
ernance scores are adjusted over time, and as such the weights assigned to each year for each
respective governance index might change. In other words, the best-case governance indices
for any given set of countries can vary over time. Moreover, each study uses di¤erent set of
countries for their analysis and the best-case scenario governance indices for those samples are
potentially di¤erent. Therefore, the best-case scenario weights need to be re-estimated periodi-
cally and/or a robustness analysis with di¤erent and full sample size best-case scenarios should
be considered in any future analysis.
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Table 1: Simulations 
 
Case 1b:            where                                                                      
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Distance Number of 
dominating indices 
Average of dominating indices 
0.07505 434 0.366 0.275 0.132 0.091 0.079 0.058 
 
Case 1c:            where                                                                      
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Distance Number of 
dominating indices 
Average of dominating indices 
0.02411 347 0.269 0.244 0.162 0.134 0.102 0.089 
 
Case 1d:                                              
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Distance Number of 
dominating indices 
Average of dominating indices 
0.0000 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Case 2:     ,                                                         
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Distance Number of 
dominating indices 
Average of dominating indices 
0.00002 41 0.030 0.024 0.026 0.199 0.337 0.384 
 
Case 3:                          and                                                             
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Distance Number of 
dominating indices 
Average of dominating indices 
0.01998 420 0.249 0.095 0.053 0.394 0.129 0.080 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1a:            where                                                                    
  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 
Distance 
 
Number of 
dominating indices 
Average of dominating indices 
0.12505 494 0.422 0.285 0.122 0.068 0.062 0.041 
Table 2: Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Voice and Accountability 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Composite Index 
Sample 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 
Mean -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Median -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 
Skewness -0.16 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.19 -0.20 -0.06 
Std. Dev. 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 
 
 Political Stability 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Composite Index 
Sample 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 179 
Mean -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 
Median 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.08 
Skewness -0.67 -0.57 -0.44 -0.31 -0.30 -0.40 -0.39 -0.49 -0.63 -0.36 
Std. Dev. 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.95 
 
Government Effectiveness 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Composite Index 
Sample 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 
Mean -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Median -0.25 -0.23 -0.19 -0.29 -0.26 -0.25 -0.28 -0.23 -0.29 -0.26 
Skewness 0.80 0.44 0.51 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.46 0.52 0.49 0.60 
Std. Dev. 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.98 
 
iv) Regularity Quality 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Composite Index 
Sample 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
Mean -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
Median 0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.17 -0.20 -0.26 -0.24 -0.18 -0.21 -0.20 
Skewness -0.58 -0.21 -0.08 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 
Std. Dev. 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 
 
Rule of Law 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Composite Index 
Sample 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
Mean -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 
Median -0.24 -0.25 -0.32 -0.36 -0.40 -0.29 -0.38 -0.48 -0.44 -0.41 
Skewness 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.47 
Std. Dev. 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.00 
 
vi) Control for Corruption 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Composite Index 
Sample 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Mean -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
Median -0.27 -0.34 -0.31 -0.33 -0.34 -0.35 -0.36 -0.33 -0.39 -0.35 
Skewness 0.71 0.66 0.67 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.91 0.81 
Std. Dev. 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 
 
 Table 3A: EL (2003) sample best-case scenario governance indices for each indicator 
Indicator Number of 
observations 
Number of 
iterations 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
VA 72 6 0.965 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PS 72 5 0.000 0.032 0.966 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
GE 71 5 0.001 0.061 0.011 0.000 0.861 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RQ 72 5 0.989 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 
RL 72 6 0.992 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 
CC 63 7 0.078 0.000 0.130 0.008 0.775 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
Table 3B: Comparisons between evaluated and best-case scenario index for EL (2003) sample 
Quartile Governance 
level 
Number of observations with the 
equally-weighted index that are above a 
given governance level 
Number of observations with the 
best-case scenario index that are 
above a given governance level 
Voice and accountability 
Q1 -0.872 56 57 
Q2 -0.220 37 38 
Q3 0.329 19 21 
Political stability 
Q1 -1.240 56 59 
Q2 -0.320 37 39 
Q3 0.180 19 23 
Government effectiveness 
Q1 -0.834 56 57 
Q2 -0.395 36 38 
Q3 0.065 18 19 
Regulatory quality 
Q1 -0.670 56 58 
Q2 -0.271 37 48 
Q3 0.270 19 28 
Rule of law 
Q1 -0.902 56 58 
Q2 -0.514 37 41 
Q3 0.098 19 21 
Control of corruption 
Q1 -0.824 47 48 
Q2 -0.414 31 33 
Q3 0.114 15 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4A: Rodrik et al. (2004) Acemoglu Sample best-case scenario governance indices for each indicator 
Indicator Number of 
observations 
Number of 
iterations 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
VA 64 4 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.972 0.000 0.000 0.006 
PS 64 4 0.003 0.014 0.920 0.009 0.000 0.052 0.002 0.000 0.000 
GE 64 5 0.000 0.020 0.006 0.001 0.896 0.075 0.002 0.000 0.000 
RQ 64 3 0.957 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.003 
RL 64 5 0.970 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.004 0.000 0.000 
CC 64 6 0.020 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.954 0.005 0.013 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
Table 4B: Comparisons between evaluated and best-case scenario index for Acemoglu sample 
Quartile Governance 
level 
Number of observations with the 
equally-weighted index that are above a 
given governance level 
Number of observations with the 
best-case scenario index that are 
above a given governance level 
Voice and accountability 
Q1 -0.873 48 52 
Q2 -0.347 32 38 
Q3 0.322 16 18 
Political stability 
Q1 -1.104 48 51 
Q2 -0.345 32 34 
Q3 0.167 16 19 
Government effectiveness 
Q1 -0.816 48 50 
Q2 -0.414 32 35 
Q3 0.066 16 17 
Regulatory quality 
Q1 -0.625 48 52 
Q2 -0.259 32 46 
Q3 0.271 16 29 
Rule of law 
Q1 -0.939 48 51 
Q2 -0.539 32 35 
Q3 0.022 16 20 
Control of corruption 
Q1 -0.835 48 49 
Q2 -0.468 32 33 
Q3 -0.051 16 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5A: Rodrik et al. (2004) Extended Acemoglu Sample best-case scenario governance indices for each 
indicator 
Indicator Number of 
observations 
Number of 
iterations 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
VA 79 5 0.943 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.048 0.003 0.003 0.000 
PS 79 5 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.995 0.000 0.002 0.000 
GE 78 5 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.017 0.843 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RQ 79 6 0.998 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RL 79 6 0.992 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
CC 70 7 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.984 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.002 
 
 
Table 5B: Comparisons between evaluated and best-case scenario index for Extended Acemoglu sample 
Quartile Governance 
level 
Number of observations with the 
equally-weighted index that are above a 
given governance level 
Number of observations with the 
best-case scenario index that are 
above a given governance level 
Voice and accountability 
Q1 -1.017 60 63 
Q2 -0.354 40 45 
Q3 0.300 20 22 
Political stability 
Q1 -1.146 60 65 
Q2 -0.345 40 41 
Q3 0.181 20 21 
Government effectiveness 
Q1 -0.878 60 63 
Q2 -0.427 40 42 
Q3 -0.069 20 23 
Regulatory quality 
Q1 -0.688 60 61 
Q2 -0.312 40 52 
Q3 0.171 20 34 
Rule of law 
Q1 -0.989 60 63 
Q2 -0.540 40 41 
Q3 0.001 20 22 
Control of corruption 
Q1 -0.876 52 53 
Q2 -0.468 34 35 
Q3 -0.044 17 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6A: Rodrik et al. (2004) Large Sample best-case scenario governance indices for each indicator 
Indicator Number of 
observations 
Number of 
iterations 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
VA 137 5 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.995 0.001 0.000 0.000 
PS 137 7 0.000 0.001 0.991 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GE 136 5 0.172 0.163 0.361 0.303 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RQ 137 4 0.282 0.567 0.037 0.025 0.033 0.037 0.005 0.000 0.014 
RL 137 6 0.980 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CC 125 7 0.178 0.022 0.581 0.217 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table 6B: Comparisons between evaluated and best-case scenario index for Large sample 
Quartile Governance 
level 
Number of observations with the 
equally-weighted index that are above a 
given governance level 
Number of observations with the 
best-case scenario index that are 
above a given governance level 
Voice and accountability 
Q1 -0.866 105 108 
Q2 -0.097 69 70 
Q3 0.740 36 37 
Political stability 
Q1 -0.924 105 111 
Q2 -0.090 69 75 
Q3 0.511 36 41 
Government effectiveness 
Q1 -0.720 105 110 
Q2 -0.235 69 72 
Q3 0.651 36 37 
Regulatory quality 
Q1 -0.576 105 112 
Q2 -0.156 69 80 
Q3 0.695 36 39 
Rule of law 
Q1 -0.832 105 106 
Q2 -0.329 69 80 
Q3 0.730 36 37 
Control of corruption  
Q1 -0.756 94 98 
Q2 -0.313 63 68 
Q3 0.718 31 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7A: Bosker and Garretsen (2009) IV Selection Sample best-case scenario governance indices for 
each indicator 
Indicator Number of 
observations 
Number of 
iterations 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
VA 79 6 0.940 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.002 0.000 0.000 
PS 79 6 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.989 0.000 0.005 0.000 
GE 78 4 0.072 0.024 0.065 0.000 0.640 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RQ 79 6 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
RL 79 5 0.980 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.000 0.000 
CC 69 6 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.992 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table 7B: Comparisons between evaluated and best-case scenario index for IV Selection Sample 
Quartile Governance 
level 
Number of observations with the 
equally-weighted index that are above a 
given governance level 
Number of observations with the 
best-case scenario index that are 
above a given governance level 
Voice and accountability 
Q1 -0.959 60 63 
Q2 -0.354 40 46 
Q3 0.300 20 22 
Political stability 
Q1 -1.146 60 67 
Q2 -0.355 40 42 
Q3 0.181 20 21 
Government effectiveness 
Q1 -0.909 60 65 
Q2 -0.458 40 41 
Q3 -0.069 20 23 
Regulatory quality 
Q1 -0.714 60 61 
Q2 -0.312 40 53 
Q3 0.171 20 33 
Rule of law 
Q1 -1.012 60 63 
Q2 -0.550 40 42 
Q3 0.001 20 23 
Control of corruption 
Q1 -0.876 52 53 
Q2 -0.468 34 35 
Q3 -0.044 17 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8A: Bosker and Garretsen (2009) Large Sample best-case scenario governance indices for each 
indicator 
Indicator Number of 
observations 
Number of 
iterations 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
VA 146 6 0.988 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PS 144 8 0.000 0.847 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GE 146 4 0.465 0.175 0.181 0.053 0.037 0.069 0.010 0.003 0.007 
RQ 147 4 0.182 0.336 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.034 0.007 0.006 
RL 137 6 0.055 0.931 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.003 
CC 122 7 0.998 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table 8B: Comparisons between evaluated and best-case scenario index for Large Sample 
Quartile Governance 
level 
Number of observations with the 
equally-weighted index that are above a 
given governance level 
Number of observations with the 
best-case scenario index that are 
above a given governance level 
Voice and accountability 
Q1 -0.804 109 110 
Q2 0.001 73 76 
Q3 0.810 38 40 
Political stability 
Q1 -0.924 109 116 
Q2 -0.015 73 74 
Q3 0.700 38 41 
Government effectiveness 
Q1 -0.672 109 112 
Q2 -0.196 73 74 
Q3 0.560 38 40 
Regulatory quality 
Q1 -0.576 109 115 
Q2 -0.113 73 83 
Q3 0.666 38 40 
Rule of law 
Q1 -0.812 105 109 
Q2 -0.210 69 73 
Q3 0.783 34 37 
Control of corruption 
Q1 -0.756 91 92 
Q2 -0.268 61 64 
Q3 0.825 31 32 
 
